Beyond Definition: A Metaphysical Inquiry into Neurodivergence
How We Know Neurodivergence
In my recent reflections on neurodiversity and neurodivergence, I argued that these are not abstract ideals or loose metaphors, but real phenomena in the world. They are as much a part of human variation as height, skin tone, or eye colour; observable in the differences in how our brains are structured and how our minds work.
But that raises a deeper question, a question that takes us out of the terrain of social policy or biological fact, and into the realm of metaphysics;
What is it to be neurodivergent?
This is a question about the nature of the thing itself, not merely its causes, effects, or political implications. It’s an inquiry into what kind of thing neurodivergence is, what makes it what it is, and how we can know when we’ve encountered it.
Ontology: The Being of Neurodivergence
Metaphysics begins with ontology the study of being. We might ask;
Is neurodivergence an intrinsic property of certain people, a quality that exists regardless of external recognition? Or is it a relational property something that only exists because society has constructed norms against which certain neurological patterns are contrasted?
If we take a strictly essentialist view, then neurodivergence is something like eye colour, it is in the person, present whether or not anyone notices or names it. On this view, an Autistic person in a pre-industrial society with no concept of autism would still be Autistic; the essence is there regardless of context.
But if we take a social constructionist view, neurodivergence only comes into being through the act of categorisation. Here, an Autistic person in a society without the concept might have traits, but “autism” as such does not exist until the social world carves it into being.
I would argue for a hybrid position. Neurodivergence has an ontological grounding in the fact of human cognitive variation, the neurological equivalent of biodiversity, but its social meaning and lived reality emerge only in a cultural context. The “being” is intrinsic; the being-as-neurodivergent is relational.
While neurodivergence itself is an abstract human construct, the variation of human neurocognition appears to be somewhat of an essential feature of our species. However it is the existence of neuronormative standards that creates a neurocognition to diverge from, hence, neurodivergence is not an essential feature itself, it is an extension of neurodiversity by virtue of it's proximity to “neurotypical”.
Identity Conditions: What Makes Neurodivergence What It Is?
In metaphysics, identity conditions are the criteria by which something counts as the thing it is. For example, a river remains the same river even as its water changes, because it retains certain structural and relational properties.
So what are the identity conditions of neurodivergence? We might propose;
Neurological difference from the statistical norm: in structure, function, or developmental pattern.
Lived cognitive difference: a phenomenological divergence in perception, attention, or reasoning.
Social positioning as “different”: the recognition of these differences by ourselves or others, often in ways that create barriers or stigma.
A person could theoretically meet 1 and 2 without 3, but in a human social world, the third condition shapes much of the lived experience of being neurodivergent. Without the social dimension, “difference” remains biologically real but socially invisible.
A consideration to make here is to whether or not our lived experience is the defining quality of neurodivergence, or whether our lived experience is the context that identifies some other quality or qualities that form the core of what neurodivergence is.
Essence and Accident
We can also distinguish between essential properties; those without which a thing would not be what it is, and accidental properties (those it could lose or gain while remaining the same thing).
Applied to neurodivergence:
Essential properties might include statistically divergent patterns of neural connectivity, sensory processing, or attentional flow.
Accidental properties might include a particular diagnosis label, or the specific coping strategies a person uses.
This is important because it pushes us to think beyond diagnostic categories. If a person no longer meets the DSM criteria for ADHD due to learned coping strategies, their essential neurodivergence has not necessarily disappeared. They remain who they are, the being is intact.
This of course has ramifications for behavioural modification interventions such as ABA or PBS. If embodiment is not an essential feature of neurodivergence, rather an accidental one, then those proponents claiming that they have “cured” a child's autism by virtue of behavioural change are making an fundamentally fallacious claim.
One could argue that the most essential feature of neurodivergence is an otherness by comparison to neuronormative standards. This however feels like needless determinism that again identifies the essence of neurodivergence by observable behaviours, and again, we have already established that outward behaviour is an accidental property and not an essential one.
Persistence Over Time
Another metaphysical question; how does neurodivergence persist through change?
The Chaotic Self model I’ve discussed elsewhere reminds us that the Self is never static; every experience changes us. But neurodivergence, at least in its essential aspects, appears to persist as a structural feature of a person’s cognitive architecture.
This means that even though an Autistic person may radically change in knowledge, skills, or worldview, the underlying attentional style, sensory processing patterns, and modes of reasoning remain constant in their structure. The ship changes its sails, but its keel is the same.
This again however can be challenged on the grounds of Neuroqueer Theory. While neuroqueering can be thought of as an intentional act of subversion with regard to neuronormativity, it also presents a world in which we can change our neurocognitive style through intentional practice.
Thus I present you with the following question; can a neurodivergent person queer their way out of neurodivergence, and if so, what does this mean for the fundamental substance of what neurodivergence is?
I will come back to this towards the end.
Epistemology: How Do We Know Neurodivergence?
Metaphysics naturally intertwines with epistemology, the study of knowledge. How do we recognise neurodivergence?
We might rely on;
First-person testimony: the lived account of difference in perception, processing, or social experience.
Third-person observation: behavioural patterns, cognitive test results, neurological imaging.
Cultural recognition: the shared concepts and language that allow these observations to be named and understood.
These sources are fallible. First-person testimony and third-person observation may be biased by neuronormative expectations; cultural recognition may be distorted by power dynamics and prejudice. While the neurodivergent person should always be considered the expert on their neurodivergent experience, we must consider that we are all shaped by the culture and beliefs we have internalised we are exposed to over time. We are subjective creatures.
This means knowing neurodivergence is not a matter of ticking boxes, but of engaging in an interpretive act; also known as hermeneutics.
Metaphysical Stakes: Why It Matters
Why dwell on metaphysics when so many urgent, practical issues surround neurodivergent lives? Because metaphysics shapes policy, ethics, and social practice.
If neurodivergence is seen as an intrinsic property, then “cures” become ethically fraught, as they aim to remove something essential to a person’s being. If it is seen as merely a social construct, then we risk denying the reality of embodied difference, treating it as something that could simply be reinterpreted away.
A hybrid metaphysical account, intrinsic being with socially constructed meaning avoids these traps. It acknowledges that we cannot understand neurodivergence without looking both at the brain and at the society in which that brain lives.
And to answer the question I posed earlier, as to whether a neurodivergent person could queer their way to neurotypical, I would argue that since neurotypicality is a performance of normativity rather than a discrete style of neurocognition, you are only altering one part of the metaphysical equation (our relationship to societal norms), thus there is no way to neuroqueer towards neurotypicality.
Toward a Relational Ontology of Neurodivergence
Relational ontology holds that beings exist not in isolation, but through their relations with others and the world. This fits neurodivergence well.
The Autistic mind is not just a set of traits; it is a pattern of relating, to sensory input, to ideas, to people, to time. The ADHD mind is not just “impulsivity” but a mode of engaging with associative thought and kinetic processing.
To be neurodivergent is to be a particular kind of “being-in-the-world” one whose intrinsic neurological form interacts with the environment in distinctive patterns, creating both challenges and opportunities.
The nature of neurodivergence is to be found in the relationship between our neurocognition and the world around us, rather than discrete essential properties.
Conclusion: The Work of Naming Being
Metaphysics does not give us final answers; it gives us better questions. By asking what it is to be neurodivergent, we can move beyond the narrow confines of diagnostic checklists or advocacy slogans.
We can begin to see neurodivergence as a mode of being that is both biologically grounded and socially interpreted, persistent yet dynamic, essential yet relational.
And perhaps most importantly, we can recognise that this mode of being is not lesser or broken, it is simply one of the many ways human minds can exist.
In the end, to ask the metaphysical question is to affirm the reality of neurodivergent existence, not as a deviation from a norm, but as part of the very fabric of what it means to be human.
Neurodiversity asserts that each human has unique neurocognition, and as such a time may come when the world no longer has a need for terms such as neurotypical or neurodivergent. It may seem counter to the point, but moving toward such a neurocosmopolitan world requires us to understand the nature of neurodivergence in our contemporary times.